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Abstract 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s late research programme can be described as a philosophical 
and theoretical-political hybrid that interpolates the central categories of Italian critical Marxism 
(workerism/operaismo) with elements drawn from post-structuralist French political 
philosophy. This form of fusion directs us towards an intellectually fruitful terrain insofar as the 
interpretative results are as much open and emancipatory as controversial. The ambition of this 
short piece is to shed light on some fundamental elements of Hardt and Negri’s philosophical and 
theoretical-political analysis that culminates in a set of promising and revolutionary arguments 
for the subversive bodies who are eager to act up against the forces of contemporary capitalism 
and advance alternative forms of organising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s recent research programme is described by Danilo Zolo as ‘a 
philosophical and theoretical-political syntax … that trans-figures fundamental categories of 
Marxism, interpolating them with elements drawn from a broad span of Western philosophical 
literature’ (2008a: 12). Indeed, Negri (2008a: 13) identifies his late research as a ‘hybrid’ between 
his workerist [operaista] Marxism and post-structuralist perspectives of French political 
philosophy, where a prominent role is given to Michel Foucault. In our view, this form of 
theoretical-political fusion directs us towards an intellectually fruitful terrain insofar as the 
interpretative results are as much open and emancipatory as they are controversial.  
 
In this short piece, it is not my aim to elaborate ‘a thousand roads that link the creative review of 
Marxism to the revolutionary conception of biopolitics elaborated by Foucault’ (Negri, 2008b: 
231). Neither is it to discuss Rabinow and Rose’s (2006), Toscano’s (2007), and Lemke’s (2011) 
problematisation of Hardt and Negri’s reading of Foucault in general, and of the limits of their 
translation of Foucault’s anti-totalising and anti-universal methodology in particular. My first and 
foremost ambition is to shed some light on Hardt and Negri’s philosophical and theoretical-
political hybrid that develops a promising argument for the dissidents who are eager to act up 
against the forces of contemporary capitalism and advance alternative or heterodox forms of 
organising: ‘capital is no longer succeeds in grasping the productivity of labour power; [capitalist] 
biopower is no longer able to hold back biopolitical productivity’ (Negri, 2008b: 43).  
 
Biopower versus Biopolitics 
 
One of the axioms embedded in Foucault’s work is that where powers are continually made and 
remade, bodies resist. Hardt and Negri reveal what they think of remained somewhat implicit in 
Foucault, that is, the dual nature of power. Foucault’s theory of power is largely developed in 
Discipline and Punish (1991) and the first volume of The History of Sexuality (1990). Hardt and 
Negri (2009) interpret that within these texts the power that Foucault develops is always double. 
First, the reader is given the complex ways in which the disciplinary regimes exercise social 
command through a diffuse network of dispositifs. By dispositif, we may think of the material, 
affective, and cognitive apparatuses working on the production of subjectivity. In addition, 
secondly, the reader is also provided (in a veiled manner) Foucault’s theorisation of other to 
power or even an other power which remains categorically unnamed. The latter could be best 
defined, according to Hardt and Negri, as ‘an alternative production of subjectivity, which not only 
resists power but also seeks autonomy from it’ (2009: 56). 
 
Recognising that the notion of power in Foucault has always a dual nature, Negri and Hardt invite 
readers to re-reflect on the concepts of biopower and biopolitics. Taking up the Foucault’s dual 
power, the authors argue that ‘history cannot be understood merely as the horizon on which 
biopower configures reality through domination’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 31). There always 
emerge the spaces of confrontation against the command imposed on subjects, to wit ‘power over 
life’ (Revel, 2002). In other words, the power that administers and produces life is continually 
confronted by aspirations to alternative existence. The latter is a power which is discerned as 
‘power of life’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 57). Hardt and Negri thus expose the difference between 
two powers on the ground that biopower is separate in its form from the power of life with which 
we move towards emancipation. In order to underscore this essential difference, Hardt and Negri 
adopt a terminological distinction -argued to be remained unexposed and even imprecise in 
Foucault 1- between biopower and biopolitics: ‘the former could be defined as the power over life 
and the latter as the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity’ 
(2009: 57). 
 
In my view, one can find more sophisticated approximation to biopolitics in Negri’s Reflections on 
Empire (2008a) and Empire and Beyond (2008b). Negri (2008a: 70-71) affirms evidently in the 
former text  that he is well-aware the way in which Foucault approaches the notion of biopolitics, 
namely as a technology of power, through localised biopowers, concerns itself with governing the 
health, hygiene, nutrition, sexuality and fertility of a ‘population’, understood as ‘an ensemble of 
living beings who present particular ontological/biological traits and whose life is susceptible to 
be controlled with the purpose of insuring, together with a better management of labour-power, 
and orderly growth of society’ (2008a: 71). In the same text, nevertheless, Negri underpins and 
justifies his own interpretation of biopolitics (and biopower) by underlining a tension he captures 
within the works of Foucault. 
 
Negri argues that biopolitics within the early texts of Foucault (where the term at first appears) 
is delineated as a police science [Polizeiwissenschaft], the science of the maintenance of social 
order of populations. It afterwards, on the contrary, seems to ‘mark the moment of surpassing 
public law, and therefore every political function that lies within the traditional state-society 
dichotomy’ and hence comes to denote ‘a political economy of life in general’, ‘a general fabric 
that covers the entire relationship between state and society’ (Negri, 2008a: 72). Consequently, 
this second formulation drives us to a T-junction: ‘should we think of biopolitics as an ensemble 
of biopowers that derive from the activity of government or, on the contrary, can we say that, to 
the extent that power has invested the whole of life, thus life too becomes a power [potere]?’ 
(2008a: 72).  
 Negri explicitly turns to the second reading of Foucault and ‘lends the analytic of biopolitics the 
full ontological weight’ (Toscano, 2007: 118). In Negri, that is to say, biopolitics is no longer 
viewed ‘as an internal articulation of the governmental practices and rationalities of biopower’ 
(Toscano, 2007: 114). On the contrary, biopolitics is recast as ‘a power expressed by life itself, not 
only in labour and language, but also in bodies, in affects, desires and sexuality’, and the power of 
life as ‘a sort of counter-power, of a potenza, a production of subjectivity that exists as a moment 
of de-subjectification’ (Negri, 2008a: 72). Allow me to quote a short passage from Commonwealth 
to make the (Hardt and) Negri’s position lucid: 
 
Our reading not only identifies biopolitics with the localised productive powers 
of life –that is, the production of affects and languages through social cooperation 
and the interaction of bodies and desires, the invention of new forms of the 
relation to the self and others, and so forth – but also affirms biopolitics as the 
creation of new subjectivities that are presented at once as resistance and de-
subjectification. (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 58-59) 
 
In this way, Negri and Hardt bring forward a quite polemical thesis that biopolitics and biopower 
are actually within an antagonistic relationship, or better biopolitics is biopower’s antagonist: 
‘history is determined by the biopolitical antagonisms and resistances to biopower’ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2009: 31). In other words, the entire development of humanity ‘is dominated by this 
insubordination of life (the power of life) against Power (the domination of life)’ (Negri, 2008c: 
207). What we have here then a distinction between the analytical categories of biopower and 
biopolitics at a level which is not close to Foucault’s own now. Negri (2008a: 73-4) speaks of 
biopower as ‘the big structures and functions of power’ imposing ‘command over life its 
technologies and its mechanisms of power [from the top]’. And, he speaks of biopolitics ‘when the 
critical analysis of command is done from the viewpoint of experiences of subjectivation and 
freedom, in short, from the bottom’. In brief, as Toscano summarises, ‘biopower is on the side of 
subjection and control, while biopolitics is rethought in terms of subjectivity and freedom’ (2007: 
118)2. 
 
Capitalism in Biopolitical Context 
 
Hardt and Negri’s late research collaboration has primarily been oriented towards locating the 
transformation of capitalist production following the industrial period on biopolitical horizon. 
The key aspect of his project has been contained in the subjectivation of Foucauldian concepts 
through their interpolation with Marxian concepts, i.e. living labour’s infusion into biopolitical 
labour and real subsumption’s infusion into biopower. Yet, first and foremost, what does the idea 
of capitalism in biopolitical context or horizon mean?  
 
In the main, it designates the fabric of social production, defining the period of post-industrial 
capitalism. In particular, it defines ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Moulier-Boutang, 2011; Vercellone 
2007) in which ‘capital … presents [itself] as biopower’ (Negri, 2008b: 4). By biopolitical context, 
it is suggested, on the one side, that ‘capitalist power has invested social relations in their entirety’ 
(2008b: 235). This precisely corresponds to ‘the total subjection of life to the economic political 
rules’ (2008b: 172). Nevertheless, it is in this very context, on the other side, the totalitarian self-
assertion of biopower ‘no longer able to hold back biopolitical productivity … by new subjects 
and by new social and political configurations’ (2008b: 230-243). ‘The biopolitical context is thus 
characterised by capital’s wholesale invasion of life but, at the same time, by the resistance and 
reaction of [biopolitical] labour power against capital’ (2008b: 182). The biopolitical context is, 
then, ‘both a mark of the most endemic control and a sign of a new insurgency’ (Toscano, 2007: 
112). It is precisely in this context that both the impasse and possibility of crossing the threshold 
of cognitive capitalism are intelligible. Allow me to break this part a little. 
 
According to Negri, capital in biopolitical context expresses itself as biopower, to wit as eugenic 
command and control upon the entirety of life from top. It increasingly orients itself towards 
integrating the entire productive potential of subjects into valorisation process. Capital, in other 
words, ‘traverses imperiously (and attempts to configure) all the moments which produce value’ 
(Negri, 2008b: 75) by ‘regulating social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing 
it, and rearticulating it’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23). By capitalist biopower, then, one might think 
of ‘the power [of capital] that acts to destroy humanity in order to put it at the service of capital 
and productivity’ (Negri, 2008b: 32). In the interest of accumulation-proper, capital ‘invests the 
dimensions of the economic, those of the political, [and] those of consciousness’ (2008b: 172, 
emphasis added). Capitalist biopower thus appears, Hardt and Negri argue, as ‘another name for 
the real subsumption of society under capital’ (2000: 365).  
 
The fulfilment of real subsumption of society under capital corresponds to such a level of invasion 
that not only do we witness the synchronisation of industrial production with the spheres of 
social but also capital’s attempt to subsume the social bios itself as understood the ways of life, 
the mode of living: ‘the entire life made of needs and desires’ (Negri, 1997: 37). In other words, 
all energies and spheres of life tendentially come to be core elements of subsumption under 
capital. At this level, Hardt and Negri write that ‘there is nothing, no “naked life”, no external 
standpoint, that can be posed outside this field permeated by money; nothing escapes money 
[read as money-capital]’ (2000: 32). The tendency of capital’s invasion of bios, the becoming of 
capitalist biopower, has recently informed the theorists of post-operaismo, particularly Morini 
and Fumagalli (2010), Fumagalli (2011) and Fumagalli and Lucarelli (2011), to introduce the 
concept of biocapitalism, referring to ‘a process of accumulation that is … founded on the 
exploitation of the entirety of human faculties’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 235). The 
characterising feature of today’s social production is polemically revealed by these authors as ‘the 
production of money by means of the commodification of bios, M-C(bios)-M’’ (Morini and 
Fumagalli, 2010: 239). 
 
At this juncture, we must note that for the workerist mode of thought, constituent power is always 
anterior; there is a ‘primacy of proletarian subjectivity’ (Callinicos, 2006: 139). The unfolding of 
capital as biopower is to be thought as ‘a consequence of the potent struggles [of the 1960s and 
1970s] whereby insurgent multitudes have forced an increasingly polyvalent and microphysical 
response by capitalist power’ (Toscano, 2007: 199). In other words, the shift of power of capital 
into biopower is to be contemplated as a direct response to the transformation of social ontology 
with the rise of biopolitical labour and ‘The Monster’3 as its paradigmatic labouring figure. Capital, 
in other words, has tendentially come to express itself as biopower in order to command newly 
flourishing modality of social production, that is, biopolitical production in which labour tends to 
create not the means of social life but social life itself, namely social relations, forms of life, and 
subjectivity itself.  
 
Hardt and Negri thus conceptualise biopolitical context as a Janus-faced notion, comprising two 
unmediateable totalities: capitalist biopower and biopolitical production. When Negri says that 
‘biopolitical context is an extension of class struggle’ (2008a: 74), he does two things: first, he re-
affirms that the potent class struggles of the 1960s and 1970s have eventually culminated in a 
social production operating on the biopolitical horizon. Second, more significantly, he radically 
offers that the social productive powers of biopolitical production can no longer be contained in 
capitalist biopower, and hence that there is a growing rupture of the concept of capital into two 
antagonistic subjectivities. But how does (Hardt and) Negri think that capitalist biopower is no 
longer able to hold back biopolitical labour?  
 
The answer lies in the argument that biopolitical labour exceeds the bounds set in its relation to 
capital. By excedence, we envision two ideas. First, Vercellone speaks of ‘the driving role of the 
production of knowledges by means of knowledges’ (2007: 16) in contemporary capitalism, and 
he argues that ‘the labour-force’s capacity for learning and creativity replaces fixed capital as the 
key factor in accumulation’ (2013: 435).  The theorist ultimately summarises the great mutation 
in the following formula: ‘we pass from the static management of resources to the dynamic 
management of [the set of] knowledges’ (2007: 33). That is to say, the knowledge mobilised by 
living labour is now hegemonic with regard to the knowledge embodied in fixed capital. This 
signifies the increasing importance of living knowledge of labour over dead knowledge of capital. 
Moulier-Boutang, in accordance with Vercellone’s insights, writes that ‘the essential point is no 
longer the expenditure of human labour-power, but that of invention-power: the living know-
how that cannot be reduced to machines’ (2011: 32). This conveys that the knowledge of living 
labour has to be constantly impelled and managed by capital. Therefore, on the one side, we affirm 
that capital desires to set in motion and absorb the living knowledge of labour. On the other side, 
however, in knowledge-based activities or biopolitical production in general labour is not 
crystallised in a material product that can be divorced from the producer. A car, for example, 
which is produced with material labour is immediately divorced from the producer. However, a 
research article, a code, an affect, an analysis, and so forth cannot be divorced from the producer 
inasmuch as these products intrinsically reside in the living subjects who produce them in the 
first place. Therefore, biopolitical labour potentially exceeds; it overflows the subsumption 
mechanisms set by capitalist biopower.  
 
Secondly, and in a direct connection with the first argument, in industrial capitalism, which finds 
its fulfilment in Taylorist production process, one’s innovative, creative, technical capacities are 
rigorously confined to a particular site, that is the specific site of material production. Consider, 
for instance, an assembly line worker working in a cable assembly factory. The whole ensemble 
of technological and mechanical knowledge the worker has accumulated through her/his lifetime 
are hardly put into work, and more significantly, those put into work are almost exclusively site 
(e.g. factory) specific. However, the production of immaterial products or immaterial elements of 
material products immediately drives workers to actualise and develop their creative, 
intellectual, communicative, networking, know-how, cooperative etc. capacities. Furthermore, 
the fruits of biopolitical labour power, not confined by the corporate walls, exceed work and spill 
over different spheres of life (as economists call externalities), and they begin to produce the 
common forms of wealth. This is point from where one might begin to envision the linkage 
between the excedence of biopolitical labour power and the accumulation of its fruits in the 
common. 
 
The common, prima facie, makes an appearance both at the beginning -as presupposition- and at 
the end -as outcome- of biopolitical production. To put it more precisely, the common consists of 
both the fruits as well as the means of –future- production. In terms of being the presupposition, 
it might appear convincingly in mind that biopolitical labour performs, and it can actually perform 
only on the terrain of the common. One can acknowledge that no one really cerebrate all alone 
but only within and through the spectres of the others’ past and present thoughts. Consider, for 
example, the production of ideas, knowledge(s), words, images, codes, languages, and such 
products. These products cannot be really produced by such a figure of genius in an ivory tower; 
by a human who is entirely isolated from the accumulated common intellect, or better to say from 
the common forms of real wealth. As Hardt and Negri say ‘our common knowledge is the 
foundation of all new production of knowledge; linguistic community is the basis of all linguistic 
innovation; … and our common social image bank makes possible the creation of new images’ 
(2004: 148).  
 
Outcome of biopolitical production, on the other side, exceeds and accrues to the common that 
ultimately becomes an objective condition for expanded production. One can acknowledge that 
the results of biopolitical production are not identical to material products, for they immediately 
and intrinsically tend towards being the common via their circulation in the circuits of social, 
cultural, digital networks. Gorz argues that when knowledge (one may consider other goods of 
biopolitical production as well) is produced and diffused, ‘it no longer has proprietors’ (1997: 
18). From the perspective of economics, Moulier-Boutang argues (2013) that today scarcity is no 
longer fatal. What we witness, according to the author, is that ‘digital world restores abundance 
that had been destroyed partly or fully buy industrial organisation of scarcity of commons’ 
(Moulier-Boutang, 2013: 86). In other words, inasmuch as the outcome of immaterial production 
could be coded in the digital media, reproduced, and delivered virtually at zero marginal cost, we 
may speak of the inversion of scarcity of commons with respect to the immaterial products. 
Considering technical development, in particular the peer-to-peer protocols, Moulier-Boutang 
underscores how the digital revolution has challenged, in terms of immaterial products, the 
statue of ‘a) reproduction; b) monopoly of circulation; c) authority that tackle with monopoly in 
interpretation; d) and finally authorship in science and culture’ (2013: 86).  
 
What we have here is then a sort of virtuous cycle which is typical of biopolitical production 
process: immaterial labourers, through working on the accumulated common forms of wealth, 
create new commons which in turn come to be the base for the expanded social production. From 
what we have noted until now, can we discern another aspect of biopolitical production? Allow 
me to consider, for instance, the production of scientific knowledge. The potential outcome in our 
case might be a journal paper, monograph, conference speech, series of lectures, contributing to 
the ground basis for the production of further scientific knowledge. Yes, we have already pointed 
out this. Extending our case, the production of scientific knowledge intrinsically requires a sort 
of engagement in social communication, relation, collaboration etc. between researchers, 
students, supervisors, editors, academicians, and so on. No scientific knowledge, no idea, no 
computer code, no natural language, no artificial language, no authorship etc. can be produced 
without a sort of engagement in collaborative, cooperative, communicative social relationship. 
From this point of view, the common appears in the centre as well. Concisely, the biopolitical 
production is increasingly conducted in the common (common understood as shared process).  
 
The general outlines biopolitical labour which positions itself hegemonically in cognitive 
capitalism reveal the growing autonomy of labour process in its relation to capital considering 
first and foremost that in biopolitical production, living labour tends to get direct access to the 
common where the raw materials of production are located, work on it with the terms of a shared 
process and produce a new product that tends to accrue to the common that eventually serves 
for or facilitates the expansion of production. Thinking of biopolitical labour process, Hardt and 
Negri state that ‘labour itself tends to produce the means of interaction, communication, and 
cooperation for production directly’ (2004: 147). The labourers, in this context, are virtually in 
no need of a figure of capitalist or/and state representatives or rather a sort of outside such as 
“managers” that would involve into the surveillance and control of labour process. Production 
tendentially reveals itself as a sort of common process. The collaboration, communication, and 
coordination between producers, which are the essential aspects of social production, no longer 
have to be made available by capital as external constituent insofar as these aspects increasingly 
flourish internally within the social networks of production (i.e. a by-product). 
 
Conclusion: A Political Opening  
 
There appears a widening breach within capital relation revealing itself as a political opening, or 
kairos (i.e. the opportune moment of breaking the chronological time of repetitiveness). The 
momentous kairos forces us to think of the ultimate project of exodus, to wit ‘the process of 
substraction from the relationship with capital by means of actualising the potential autonomy of 
labour-power’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 152). It entails ‘a refusal of the increasingly restrictive 
fetters placed on its productive capacities by capital and transforming the relationships of 
production and mode of social organisation under which we live’ (2009: 153).  
 
However, we must always bear in mind that the politic opening is just signalling the possibility of 
a new process of political composition of labour. The democratic and political potentiality of 
biopolitical labour force does never culminate in the organisation of exodus in an abrupt manner. 
In potentia, often resting latent, has to be transformed in actu by the means of -this is paramount- 
political action and organisation. The ultimate desire is human liberation; a process of subtraction 
from capital in the way of re-appropriating the means of production and reproduction. Exodus, in 
cognitive capitalism, is before our eyes but it is promising only in the protection the common and 
only by the means of political action and organisation. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Foucault used biopolitics in some texts as a synonym for biopower; in others he conceived of 
biopolitics as the opposite of biopower (see. Lemke, 2011) 
2. We should note here that the transformation of these categories in this way also confirms 
Negri’s position concerning the end of possibility of any sort of mediation and dialectic 
under the “real subsumption” under capital. In his 1989 book The Politics of Subversion, 
Negri openly declared that ‘mediation is dead. The production of goods takes place 
through domination. The relationship between … domination/profit and 
resistance/wages cannot be harmonised’ (1989: 183). 
3. The Monster becomes the real political and technical subject of the production of 
commodities and reproduction of life. The monster has become biopolitical … He is no 
longer a margin, a residue, a leftover: he is internal, totalising movement, a subject. He 
expresses power’ (Negri, 2008c: 206-7) 
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